Researcher: Atakan, Alp Enver
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Atakan, Alp Enver
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Publication Metadata only Bargaining and reputation in search markets(Oxford Univ Press, 2014) Ekmekci, Mehmet; Department of Economics; Atakan, Alp Enver; Faculty Member; Department of Economics; College of Administrative Sciences and Economics; 39383This article considers a two-sided search market where firms and workers are paired to bargain over a unit surplus. The matching market serves as an endogenous outside option for the agents. The market includes inflexible commitment types who demand a constant portion of any match surplus. The frequency of such types is determined in equilibrium.An equilibrium where there are significant delays in reaching an agreement and where negotiations occasionally break down on the equilibrium path is constructed. Such an equilibrium exists and commitment types affect bargaining dynamics even if the equilibrium frequency of such types is negligible. If the inflows of firms and workers into the market are symmetric, then bargaining involves two-sided reputation building and reputation concerns lead to delays and inefficiency. Access to the market exacerbates bargaining inefficiencies caused by inflexible types. If the inflows of workers and firms are sufficiently asymmetric, then bargaining involves one-sided reputation and commitment types determine the terms of trade.Publication Metadata only Reputation in long-run relationships(Oxford Univ Press, 2012) Ekmekci, Mehmet; Department of Economics; Atakan, Alp Enver; Faculty Member; Department of Economics; College of Administrative Sciences and Economics; 39383We model a long-run relationship as an infinitely repeated game played by two equally patient agents. In each period, the agents play an extensive-form stage game of perfect information with either locally non-conflicting interests or strictly conflicting interests. There is incomplete information about the type of Player 1, while Player 2's type is commonly known. We show that a sufficiently patient Player 1 can leverage Player 2's uncertainty about his type to secure his highest pay-off, compatible with Player 2's individual rationality, in any perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the repeated game.Publication Metadata only A two-sided reputation result with long-run players(Academic Press Inc Elsevier Science, 2013) Ekmekçi, Mehmet; Department of Economics; Atakan, Alp Enver; Faculty Member; Department of Economics; College of Administrative Sciences and Economics; 39383We establish reputation results, under two sided incomplete information, for a class of repeated games. We consider a repeated game that satisfies the assumptions of either Atakan and Ekmekci (2012) [3] or Cripps et al. (2005) [6] and we assume that both players are Stackelberg types with positive probability. If the stage game is not a common interest game, then equilibrium play converges to the unique equilibrium of a continuous time war of attrition as the stage game is repeated arbitrarily frequently. Alternatively, if the stage game is a common-interest game, then the players' equilibrium payoffs converge to their highest payoffs as the stage game is repeated arbitrarily frequently. (C) 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.Publication Metadata only Auctions, actions, and the failure of information aggregation(Amer Economic Assoc, 2014) Ekmekci, Mehmet; Department of Economics; Atakan, Alp Enver; Faculty Member; Department of Economics; College of Administrative Sciences and Economics; 39383We study a uniform-price auction where k identical common-value objects are allocated amongst z > k bidders who have imperfect signals about the state of the world. The common valuation is determined jointly by the state and an action that is chosen after winning an object. In large auctions, there are symmetric equilibria where the auction price aggregates no information. Moreover, market statistics other than price (e.g., the amount of rationing or the bid distribution) contain extra information about the state. In contrast, in standard large auctions without actions, the price aggregates all relevant information.Publication Metadata only Reputation in the long-run with imperfect monitoring(Academic Press Inc Elsevier Science, 2015) Ekmekçi, Mehmet; Department of Economics; Atakan, Alp Enver; Faculty Member; Department of Economics; College of Administrative Sciences and Economics; 39383We study an infinitely repeated game where two players with equal discount factors play a simultaneous-move stage game. Player one monitors the stage-game actions of player two imperfectly, while player two monitors the pure stage-game actions of player one perfectly. Player one's type is private information and he may be a "commitment type," drawn from a countable set of commitment types, who is locked into playing a particular strategy. Under a full-support assumption on the monitoring structure, we prove a reputation result for stage games with a strong Stackelberg action: if there is positive probability that player one is a particular type whose commitment payoff is equal to player one's highest payoff, consistent with the players' individual rationality, then a patient player one secures this type's commitment payoff in any Bayes-Nash equilibrium of the repeated game. In contrast, if the type's commitment payoff is strictly less than player one's highest payoff consistent with the players' individual rationality, then the worst perfect Bayesian equilibrium payoff for a patient player one is equal to his minimax payoff. (C) 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.Publication Open Access Market selection and the information content of prices(Wiley, 2021) Ekmekçi, Mehmet; Department of Economics; Atakan, Alp Enver; Faculty Member; Department of Economics; College of Administrative Sciences and Economics; 39383We study information aggregation when n bidders choose, based on their private information, between two concurrent common-value auctions. There are k(s) identical objects on sale through a uniform-price auction in market s and there are an additional k(r) objects on auction in market r, which is identical to market s except for a positive reserve price. The reserve price in market r implies that information is not aggregated in this market. Moreover, if the object-to-bidder ratio in market s exceeds a certain cutoff, then information is not aggregated in market s either. Conversely, if the object-to-bidder ratio is less than this cutoff, then information is aggregated in market s as the market grows arbitrarily large. Our results demonstrate how frictions in one market can disrupt information aggregation in a linked, frictionless market because of the pattern of market selection by imperfectly informed bidders.Publication Open Access Starting small to communicate(Elsevier, 2020) Kubilay, Elif; Department of Economics; Atakan, Alp Enver; Koçkesen, Levent; Faculty Member; Faculty Member; Department of Economics; College of Administrative Sciences and Economics; 39383; 37861We analyze a repeated cheap-talk game in which the receiver is privately informed about the conflict of interest between herself and the sender and either the sender or the receiver controls the stakes involved in their relationship. We focus on payoff-dominant equilibria that satisfy a Markovian property and show that if the potential conflict of interest is large, then the stakes increase over time, i.e., “starting small” is the unique equilibrium arrangement. In each period, the receiver plays the sender's ideal action with positive probability and the sender provides full information as long as he has always observed his ideal actions in the past. We also show that as the potential conflict of interest increases, the extent to which the stakes are back-loaded increases, i.e., stakes are initially smaller but grow faster.