Researcher:
Sertel, Murat Rauf

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Murat Rauf

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Sertel

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Sertel, Murat Rauf

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Researcher Of Publications: search.filters.isAuthorOfPublication.37939142-f609-49b6-aeac-26eca041124a

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Now showing 1 - 4 of 4
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    Bargaining over a finite set of alternatives
    (Springer, 2007) Kıbrıs, Özgür; Department of Economics; Sertel, Murat Rauf; Other; Department of Economics; College of Administrative Sciences and Economics; N/A
    We analyze bilateral bargaining over a finite set of alternatives. We look for "good" ordinal solutions to such problems and show that Unanimity Compromise and Rational Compromise are the only bargaining rules that satisfy a basic set of properties. We then extend our analysis to admit problems with countably infinite alternatives. We show that, on this class, no bargaining rule choosing finite subsets of alternatives can be neutral. When rephrased in the utility framework of Nash (1950), this implies that there is no ordinal bargaining rule that is finite-valued.
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    The manipulability of matching rules via segmentation
    (Springer Nature, 2007) Özkal Sanver, İpek; Department of Economics; Sertel, Murat Rauf; Other; Department of Economics; College of Administrative Sciences and Economics; N/A
    Our matching problems feature agents with endowments facing certain division rules. At any matching, the endowments of agents are reallocated between the matched pairs according to some given division rule, and this opens doors to an iterated matching problem and rematching, and to manipulation of some matching rules via segmentation. In this form of manipulation a coalition breaks off from the rest, matches within itself and rejoins the complementary coalition for a rematching at the new endowment profile. Under certain division rules this may benefit the coalition who breaks off without hurting the complementary coalition. Furthermore, both may benefit by first matching internally and then rejoining for a new match.
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    Erratum: ranking committees, income streams or multisets
    (Springer Nature, 2007) Slinko, Arkadii; Department of Economics; Sertel, Murat Rauf; Other; Department of Economics; College of Administrative Sciences and Economics; N/A
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    Ranking committees, income streams or multisets
    (Springer Nature, 2007) Slinko, Arkadii; Department of Economics; Sertel, Murat Rauf; Other; Department of Economics; College of Administrative Sciences and Economics; N/A
    Multisets are collections of objects which may include several copies of the same object. They may represent bundles of goods, committees formed of members of several political parties, or income streams. In this paper we investigate the ways in which a linear order on a finite set A can be consistently extended to an order on the set of all multisets on A of some given cardinality k and when such an extension arises from a utility function on A. The condition of consistency that we introduce is a close relative of the de Finetti's condition that defines comparative probability orders. We prove that, when A has three elements, any consistent linear order on multisets on A of cardinality k arises from a utility function and all such orders can be characterised by means of Farey fractions. This is not true when A has cardinality four or greater. It is proved that, unlike linear orders that can be represented by a utility function, any non-representable order on the set of all multisets of cardinality k cannot be extended to a consistent linear order on multisets of cardinality K for sufficiently large K. We also discuss the concept of risk aversion arising in this context.