Researcher:
Doğan, Pınar

Loading...
Profile Picture
ORCID

Job Title

Faculty Member

First Name

Pınar

Last Name

Doğan

Name

Name Variants

Doğan, Pınar

Email Address

Birth Date

Search Results

Now showing 1 - 2 of 2
  • Placeholder
    Publication
    Unbundling the local loop
    (Elsevier, 2005) Bourreau, Marc; Department of Economics; Department of Economics; Doğan, Pınar; Faculty Member; College of Administrative Sciences and Economics; N/A
    We study competition for high bandwidth services in the telecommunications industry by introducing the possibility of unbundling the local loop, where leased lines permit the entrant to provide services without building up its own infrastructure. We use a dynamic model of technology adoption and study the incentives of the entrant to lease loops and compete "service-based", and/or to build up a new and more efficient infrastructure and compete "facility-based", given the rental price. We show that the incumbent sets too low a rental price for its loops; hence, the entrant adopts the new technology too late from a social welfare perspective. The distortion may appear not only on the timing of technology adoption but also on the type (quality) of the new technology to be adopted. We also show that while regulating the rental price may suffice to achieve socially desirable outcomes, a sunset clause does not improve social welfare.
  • Placeholder
    Publication
    Service-based vs. Ffacility-based competition in local access networks
    (Elsevier Science Bv, 2004) Bourreau, M; Department of Economics; Department of Economics; Doğan, Pınar; Faculty Member; College of Administrative Sciences and Economics; N/A
    In this paper we argue that service-based competition may deter (or delay) facility-based competition. Hence, to the extent that service-based and facility-based entry are perceived as substitute strategies by the entrants, regulatory policies that are aimed at each one of them may exhibit conflicts. We develop our arguments on the basis of our formal studies, Bourreau and Dogan (2002a,b), where an incumbent and an entrant compete for providing high-bandwidth services. We claim that an incumbent who faces an effective threat of facility-based competition can strategically delay facility-based entry by providing attractive terms of access to its facilities. The delay that is introduced by attractive terms of access is by virtue of a replacement effect, which may also affect the choice of technology to be eventually built by the entrant. (C) 2003 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.