Researcher:
Ertaç, Seda

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Seda

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Ertaç

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Ertaç, Seda

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2011 - 2019192020 - 20214

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Researcher Of Publications: search.filters.isAuthorOfPublication.73910b9b-1580-459a-bfd3-3af37d92e746

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Now showing 1 - 10 of 23
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    The role of verifiability and privacy in the strategic provision of performance feedback: theory and experimental evidence
    (Academic Press Inc Elsevier Science, 2016) Ozdemir, Duygu; Department of Economics; Department of Economics; Ertaç, Seda; Koçkesen, Levent; Faculty Member; Faculty Member; Department of Economics; College of Administrative Sciences and Economics; College of Administrative Sciences and Economics; 107102; 37861
    We theoretically and experimentally analyze the role of verifiability and privacy in strategic performance feedback using a "one principal-two agent" context with real effort. We confirm the theoretical prediction that information transmission occurs only in verifiable feedback mechanisms and private-verifiable feedback is the most informative mechanism. Yet, subjects also exhibit some behavior that cannot be explained by our baseline model, such as telling the truth even when this will definitely hurt them, interpreting "no feedback" more optimistically than they should, and being influenced by feedback given to the other agent. We show that a model with individual-specific lying costs and naive agents can account for some, but not all, of these findings. We conclude that although agents do take into account the principal's strategic behavior to form beliefs in a Bayesian fashion, they are overly optimistic and interpret positive feedback to the other agent more pessimistically than they should. (C) 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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    On the cultural basis of gender differences in negotiation
    (Springer, 2018) Andersen, Steffen; Gneezy, Uri; List, John A.; Maximiano, Sandra; Department of Economics; Ertaç, Seda; Faculty Member; Department of Economics; College of Administrative Sciences and Economics; 107102
    We study how culture and social structure influence bargaining behavior across gender, by exploring the negotiation culture in matrilineal and patriarchal societies using data from a laboratory experiment and a natural field experiment. One interesting result is that in both the actual marketplace and in the laboratory bargaining game, women in the matrilineal society earn more than men, at odds with years of evidence observed in the western world. We find that this result is critically driven by which side of the market the person is occupying: female (male) sellers in the matrilineal (patriarchal) society extract more of the bargaining surplus than male (female) sellers. In the buyer role, however, we observe no significant differences across societies.
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    Cheating and incentives in a performance context: evidence from a field experiment on children
    (Elsevier, 2020) Alan, Şule; Department of Economics; N/A; Ertaç, Seda; Gümren, Mert; Faculty Member; Researcher; Department of Economics; College of Administrative Sciences and Economics; Graduate School of Sciences and Engineering; 107102; N/A
    We study cheating behavior in a large sample of elementary school children in the context of a creative performance task, in the presence and absence of performance incentives. Our data come from a sample of 720 elementary school children with an average age of 8, and contain rich information on a large set of correlates, such as risk and time preferences, IQ, gender and family characteristics. We document that children with higher IQ and higher socioeconomic status have a higher likelihood of cheating. We find that the presence of incentives for better performance does not increase cheating behavior. We also document an interesting interaction between altruism and incentives: altruistic students cheat significantly less in the presence of incentives. (C) 2019 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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    Fostering patience in the classroom: results from randomized educational intervention
    (Univ Chicago Press, 2018) Alan, Şule; Department of Economics; Ertaç, Seda; Faculty Member; Department of Economics; College of Administrative Sciences and Economics; 107102
    We evaluate the impact of a randomized educational intervention on children's intertemporal choices. The intervention aims to improve the ability to imagine future selves and encourages forward-looking behavior using a structured curriculum delivered by children's own trained teachers. We find that treated students make more patient intertemporal decisions in incentivized experimental tasks. The results persist almost 3 years after the intervention, replicate well in a different sample, and are robust across different experimental elicitation methods. The effects also extend beyond experimental outcomes: we find that treated students are significantly less likely to receive a low behavior grade.
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    Demand for decision autonomy and the desire to avoid responsibility in risky environments: experimental evidence
    (Elsevier, 2020) Gürdal, Mehmet Y.; Department of Economics; N/A; Ertaç, Seda; Gümren, Mert; Faculty Member; Researcher; Department of Economics; College of Administrative Sciences and Economics; Graduate School of Sciences and Engineering; 107102; N/A
    This paper experimentally studies individuals' willingness to pay for the authority to make risky decisions for themselves, and the willingness to take responsibility for others, as primary determinants of leadership willingness. We consider a setup involving a pair of individuals, where one individual is designated to make both parties' decisions by default. Depending on treatment, either party can express a willingness to pay to change this situation. If one's willingness to pay to make her own decision herself is positive (negative), we interpret it as a demand for autonomy (a desire to delegate). on the flip side, if one's willingness to pay to avoid making a decision on behalf of another person is positive (negative), we interpret it as a desire to avoid responsibility (a demand for authority). We find that on average, individuals are willing to pay positive amounts of money to make their decisions themselves, and incur positive but smaller opportunity costs for the right to make decisions for others. Certain individual and contextual characteristics emerge as important predictors. Notably, (1) men are more likely to demand both autonomy and authority at the same time, (2) individuals with other regarding preferences are more likely to pay to avoid taking responsibility for others' decisions when the probability of loss is high. Exploring differences between individuals' own decisions and the decisions they make on behalf of others, we find that subjects with other-regarding preferences tend to "cautious-shift" when making decisions on behalf of others. Also, we find that individuals who would like to avoid responsibility also tend to "shift" their decisions when put in a decision-making role. The results have implications for the allocation of decision-making authority in pairs and leadership.
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    Strategic feedback ın teams: theory and experimental evidence
    (Elsevier Science Bv, 2019) Kockesen, Levent; Department of Economics; N/A; Ertaç, Seda; Gümren, Mert; Faculty Member; Researcher; Department of Economics; College of Administrative Sciences and Economics; Graduate School of Sciences and Engineering; 107102; N/A
    We theoretically and experimentally analyze public and private feedback in teams that are characterized by different performance technologies. We consider a setting where the principal has some performance relevant private information and can either report this information truthfully or strategically withhold feedback. We find that if team performance is determined by the best performer (the "best-shot technology"), then both public and private feedback are better than no feedback unless the team is composed of all low performers, in which case no feedback is best. If, on the other hand, team performance is determined by the worst performer (the weakest-link technology), then no feedback is the best regime unless the team is composed of all high performers, in which-case public or private feedback is better. Our results have implications for feedback policies in teams, organizations, and the workplace. (C) 2019 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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    Entry into auctions: an experimental analysis
    (Elsevier, 2011) Hortacsu, Ali; Roberts, James W.; Department of Economics; Ertaç, Seda; Faculty Member; Department of Economics; College of Administrative Sciences and Economics; 107102
    This paper investigates entry decisions into first and second-price auctions using an experimental design to extract information on willingness-to-pay to enter (WTE). We find that subjects tend to overpay to enter both auction formats. In particular, if the subjects believe they will be bidding against bidders following the risk-neutral Nash strategy, their WTE is greater than the optimal risk-neutral amount 97% of the time for first-price auctions (FPA) and 90% for second-price auctions (SPA). If they believe that they are bidding against subjects who bid as do the other subjects, they submit a WIT that is too high 92% of the time for FPA and 69% of the time for SPA. We also find, in line with previous studies, significant overbidding in both the FPA and SPA. We then investigate whether introducing risk aversion (RA) or "joy of winning" (JOY) can explain the joint observation of over-entry and overbidding. In particular, using bid data alone, we structurally estimate three models, one allowing RA only, one allowing for JOY only and one allowing for both RA and JOY. While a model with JOY alone overestimates WTE, we find that RA alone can explain 38% of WTE but a model with both RA and JOY (where RA is estimated using FPA bids, and JOY is estimated using SPA bids) can explain 65% of WTE. Moreover, JOY appears to explain nearly all of the male WTE but only 44% of the female WTE. (C) 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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    Does a forward-looking perspective affect self-control and the demand for commitment? results from an educational intervention
    (Wiley, 2021) Alan, Şule; Gümüş, İnci; Department of Economics; Ertaç, Seda; Faculty Member; Department of Economics; College of Administrative Sciences and Economics; 107102
    This paper reports the results from a randomized educational intervention, that aims to build a forward-looking perspective in children. We evaluate the effects of the intervention on planning, commitment and consumption decisions in an intertemporal task using a temptation good, chocolate. We find that treated children end up consuming less chocolate on the earlier date than control children. This is both because they make more patient consumption plans, and because they exhibit a type of extreme self-control, eating even less than they had planned. Treatment effects are heterogeneous on gender, with treated girls becoming less present-biased (as well as more future-biased).
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    Removal of ocular artifacts in EEG signals measured in a neuroeconomics experiment
    (IEEE, 2017) Kazanc, Mehmet Emin; Kahya, Yasemin; Guclu, Burak; Department of Economics; Ertaç, Seda; Faculty Member; Department of Economics; College of Administrative Sciences and Economics; 107102
    In neuroeconomics experiments many ocular artifacts are encountered during long trial durations. In this study, results from algorithms used to remove artifacts in EEG measurements are presented. The study consists of three parts. In the first part, EEG signals were band-pass filtered to remove high frequency noise and low frequency drift. Next, the artifacts were removed by using traditional regression method and independent component analysis (ICA). Finally, the performances of the two artifact removal methods were compared. Although artifacts were suppressed better by ICA than regression, ICA caused decrease in root mean square (RMS) values of the non-artifactual parts of some channels.
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    Patience, self-control and the demand for commitment: evidence from a large-scale field experiment
    (Elsevier Science Bv, 2015) Alan, Sule; Department of Economics; Ertaç, Seda; Faculty Member; Department of Economics; College of Administrative Sciences and Economics; 107102
    Patience and self-control are important non-cognitive skills that are associated with favorable educational, economic and social outcomes. This paper provides empirical evidence to inform discussions on possible educational interventions to make children more forward-looking or less present-biased, by putting forward a way to identify self-control problems in children and exploring the role of commitment devices in mitigating such problems. We report results from an experiment that measures planned allocations, the demand for a commitment device, and actual choices in the context of chocolate consumption over two days. The experiment is conducted as part of a large field study on children's preferences, which allows us to correlate behavior with variables related to the subjects' socio-economic background and educational environment, as well as preference parameters elicited through other tasks and surveys. We find a large demand for commitment among children. In addition, we identify important correlations between patience, commitment demand and time inconsistency, as well as student-specific personality traits and outcomes such as school success. (C) 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.