Researcher:
Storey, Damien

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Damien

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Storey

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Storey, Damien

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2018 - 201922020 - 20222

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    Sex, wealth, and courage: kinds of goods and the power of appearance in plato's protagoras
    (Philosophy Documentation Center, 2018) Department of Philosophy; Storey, Damien; Faculty Member; Department of Philosophy; College of Social Sciences and Humanities; 293535
    I offer a reading of the two conceptions of the good found in Plato’s Protagoras: the popular conception—‘the many’s’ conception—and Socrates’ conception. I pay particular attention to the three kinds of goods Socrates introduces: (a) bodily pleasures like food, drink, and sex; (b) instrumental goods like wealth, health, or power; and (c) virtuous actions like courageously going to war. My reading revises existing views about these goods in two ways. First, I argue that the many are only ‘hedonists’ in a very attenuated sense. They do not value goods of kind (b) simply as means to pleasures of kind (a); rather, they have fundamentally different attitudes to (a) and (b). Second, the hedonism that Socrates’ defends includes a distinction between kinds of pleasures: (a) bodily pleasures and (c) the pleasures of virtuous actions. This distinction between kinds of pleasures—some that do and some that do not exert the ‘power of appearance’—allows Socrates to address one of the central beliefs in the popular conception of akrasia, namely that it involves a special kind of unruly desire: non-rational appetites for pleasures like food, drink, or sex. Socrates replaces the motivational push of non-rational appetites with the epistemic pull of the appearance of immediate pleasures like food, drink, and sex.
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    The soul-turning metaphor in Plato’s Republic Book 7
    (University of Chicago Press, 2022) Department of Philosophy; Storey, Damien; Faculty Member; Department of Philosophy; College of Social Sciences and Humanities; 293535
    This paper examines the soul-turning metaphor in Book 7 of Plato’s Republic. It argues that the failure to find a consistent reading of how the metaphor is used has contributed to a number of long-standing disagreements, especially concerning the more famous metaphor with which it is intertwined, the Cave allegory. A full reading of the metaphor, as it occurs throughout Book 7, is offered, with particularly close attention to what is one of the most difficult and stubbornly divisive passages in Book 7, 532b6–d1. © 2022 The University of Chicago. All rights reserved.
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    Dianoia & Plato's divided line
    (Brill, 2022) Department of Philosophy; Storey, Damien; Faculty Member; Department of Philosophy; College of Social Sciences and Humanities; 293535
    This paper takes a detailed look at the Republic’s Divided Line analogy and considers how we should respond to its most contentious implication: that pistis and dianoia have the same degree of ‘clarity’ (σαφήνεια). It argues that we must take this implication at face value and that doing so allows us to better understand both the analogy and the nature of dianoia.
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    The translation of Republic 606A3-B5 and Plato's partite psychology
    (The University of Chicago Press, 2019) Department of Philosophy; Storey, Damien; Faculty Member; Department of Philosophy; College of Social Sciences and Humanities