Researcher:
Banerjee, Saugata

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Researcher

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Saugata

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Banerjee

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Banerjee, Saugata

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1996 - 19973

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Researcher Of Publications: search.filters.isAuthorOfPublication.a0373454-04b4-4ba4-af89-a5f53866f9fa

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    Syndicated lending under asymmetric creditor information - Correction
    (Elsevier, 1996) Cadot, O; Department of Business Administration; Banerjee, Saugata; Researcher; Department of Business Administration; College of Administrative Sciences and Economics; N/A
    This paper explores how asymmetric information about borrower quality among syndicated lenders alters the incentive to refinance illiquid borrowers. We use a model in which lenders enter the market sequentially in two rounds of lending. Between the two rounds, a shock separates borrowers into good ones and bad ones, and early entrants acquire information about individual borrower type, while late entrants know only the distribution of borrower types. The asymmetric information structure gives rise to both signalling and screening issues. We show that self-selecting contracts do not exist, and that there is always a pooling Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium in which late entrants lend to both good and bad types, without borrower type being exposed before final clearing at the terminal time. Based on this framework, we argue that prior to the 1982 international debt crisis, it was possible for banks with heavy exposure to troubled debtors to attract rational newcomers in syndicated loans which were, with positive probability, bailout loans.
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    Syndicated lending under asymmetric creditor information
    (Elsevier, 1996) Cadot, O; Department of Business Administration; Banerjee, Saugata; Researcher; Department of Business Administration; College of Administrative Sciences and Economics; N/A
    This paper explores how asymmetric information about borrower quality among syndicated lenders alters the incentive to refinance illiquid borrowers. We use a model in which lenders enter the market sequentially in two rounds of lending. Between the two rounds, a shock separates borrowers into good ones and bad ones, and early entrants acquire information about individual borrower type, while late entrants know only the distribution of borrower types. The asymmetric information structure gives rise to both signalling and screening issues. We show that self-selecting contracts do not exist, and that there is always a pooling Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium in which late entrants lend to both good and bad types, without borrower type being exposed before final clearing at the terminal time. Based on this framework, we argue that prior to the 1982 international debt crisis, it was possible for banks with heavy exposure to troubled debtors to attract rational newcomers in syndicated loans which were, with positive probability, bailout loans.
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    Large shareholdings and corporate control: an analysis of stake purchases by French holding companies[this resea]
    (Wiley, 1997) Leleux, Benoit; Vermaelen, Theo; Department of Business Administration; Banerjee, Saugata; Researcher; Department of Business Administration; College of Administrative Sciences and Economics; N/A
    The paper analyses the value creation benefits of the holding form of organisation in France by empirically examining the effects of non-controlling stake purchases on target shareholder wealth, operational performance and bidder shareholder returns for a sample of 122 stake purchases in French listed companies. The evidence puts into question the ability of holding companies to create value for the firms they purchase stakes in or their own shareholders, adding to the current debate on the relative role played by large shareholders and the external market for corporate control as ultimate disciplining devices.