Researcher:
Ekinci, Emre

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Emre

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Ekinci

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Ekinci, Emre

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2019 - 201912020 - 20225

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Researcher Of Publications: search.filters.isAuthorOfPublication.ab132445-47bd-4da5-b52e-3a8ba90fe409

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    Monetary rewards in employee referral programs
    (Wiley, 2022) Department of Economics; Ekinci, Emre; Faculty Member; Department of Economics; College of Administrative Sciences and Economics; 309364
    This paper examines the conditions under which employee referrals serve as a screening function when there is a conflict of interest between the firm and the current employees concerning referral recruitment. In particular, I consider two potential mechanisms that lead to a conflict of interest: the employee's social connection with the applicant and her promotion prospects. Specifically, I posit that the employee will have an incentive to refer low-ability applicants if she has a strong social connection with them or if she faces the possibility of competing against her own referral to earn a promotion at the firm. Taking these potential sources for conflicting interests, I investigate the extent to which the firm can make use of financial incentives (fixed fees and bonuses) to align incentives of the employee with those of the firm.
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    Discretionary bonuses and turnover
    (Elsevier, 2019) Department of Economics; Ekinci, Emre; Faculty Member; Department of Economics; College of Administrative Sciences and Economics; 309364
    This paper develops a signaling model to investigate the effects of discretionary bonuses and wage increases on turnover. When the worker's output is not contractible and the firm privately learns about the match quality between the firm and the worker, bonus payments and wage increases can convey the firm's private information to the worker. If the firm credibly communicates favorable information about the match quality to a worker, the worker develops higher expectations concerning her career outcomes at the firm (such as future wage increases and promotions) and, consequently, becomes less likely to separate. The analysis demonstrates that although a wage increase and a bonus reflect the same information regarding the match quality, each serves a distinctly different role in terms of the worker's turnover decision. Specifically, the firm pays bonuses to signal a good match while using wages to respond to competing offers the worker receives. The model yields testable predictions that concern how bonuses are related to wage increases and promotions and how bonuses and wage increases are related to turnover. The empirical analysis based on the data constructed from the personnel records of a large firm in the financial services industry provides support for the model's implications.
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    Employee entrepreneurship and signaling role of corporate venturing decisions
    (Elsevier, 2022) Department of Economics; Ekinci, Emre; Faculty Member; Department of Economics; College of Administrative Sciences and Economics; 309364
    This paper develops a signaling model to examine firms' corporate venturing decisions about projects proposed by their current employees. When the firm has better information, vis-a-vis the market, about the entrepreneurial ability of the employee, its decision to implement the worker's project serves as a signal of high ability. This provides the firm with an incentive to distort the corporate venturing decision to conceal information from the market. The model provides a rationale for why the likelihood of corporate venturing decreases with the worker's tenure at the firm. Also, the analysis shows that higher degrees of competition in the firm's core business weaken its incentive to distort project implementation, thereby leading to higher levels of corporate venturing activity.
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    Disagreement and informal delegation in organizations
    (Elsevier, 2021) Theodoropoulos, Nikolaos; Department of Economics; Ekinci, Emre; Faculty Member; Department of Economics; College of Administrative Sciences and Economics; 309364
    To investigate delegation decisions within organizations, we develop a principal-agent model in which the principal can only informally delegate authority to the agent and the parties openly disagree with each other in the sense of differing prior beliefs about the optimal course of action. Our analysis shows that the degree of disagreement determines what kind of delegation policy the principal can commit to and this, in turn, alters the agent's effort for information acquisition. Notably, at moderate degrees of disagreement, conditional delegation may arise in equilibrium, whereby the principal credibly commits to allowing the agent to exercise his authority only if he generates additional information about the optimal action. Further, we discuss two extensions in which the principal undertakes an investment that reduces the agent's cost of acquiring information, and the agent discloses his private information strategically. (C) 2020 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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    PublicationOpen Access
    Correlates of turnover: salary and bonuses
    (2022) Department of Economics; Ekinci, Emre; Faculty Member; Department of Economics; College of Administrative Sciences and Economics; 309364
    Purpose: this paper investigates how salaries and bonus payments are related to turnover. Design/methodology/approach: the wealth maximization hypothesis posits that turnover is negatively related to the worker’s expected future earnings at the current firm. Thus, salary and bonuses should be related to turnover to the extent they provide information about the worker’s future earnings at the firm. To evaluate this hypothesis, this paper uses data coming from the personnel records of a medium-sized US firm in the financial services industry. Results: the regression results show that pay variables are serially correlated and they signal future promotions in the firm. Thus, both salaries and bonuses provide information about the worker’s future earnings through these two channels. Further, as predicted by the wealth maximization hypothesis, both salaries and bonuses are related to turnover. In particular, the results show that the growth rate of salary and bonus size (as well as earning a bonus in the current year) are negatively related to turnover.Discussion: the findings of this study underscore the importance of pay variables on turnover behavior. While most existing studies focus on salaries, thereby ignoring bonuses, the current analysis shows that bonus payments are an important determinant of turnover. Hence, in addition to providing workers with effort incentives, the retention function of bonuses should be taken into account for designing optimal compensation schemes.
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    PublicationOpen Access
    Determinants of delegation: evidence from British establishment data
    (Boğaziçi Üniversitesi İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi, 2021) Theodoropoulos, Nikolaos; Department of Economics; Ekinci, Emre; Faculty Member; Department of Economics; College of Administrative Sciences and Economics; 309364
    This paper provides an empirical analysis of firms’ delegation decisions by using a matched employer-employee dataset from Britain. In our analysis, we first investigate if firm-provided training is positively related to delegating authority, as predicted by the existing theories. We then consider variables that can potentially increase the value of delegation. In particular, we conjecture that firms become more likely to delegate authority as they face higher uncertainty or as the employees acquire more precise information. To test these hypotheses, we use market conditions to measure uncertainty and correlates of worker productivity to measure the precision of the employee’s information. / Bu çalışma, Britanya’da oluşturulan eşlenmiş işveren-çalışan veri setini kullanarak, firmaların yetkilendirme (delegasyon) kararlarının ampirik bir analizini sunmaktadır. Analizimizde ilk olarak, mevcut teorilerin öngördüğü üzere firma tarafından sağlanan eğitim ile yetkilendirme kararları arasında pozitif bir ilişkili olup olmadığını araştırıyoruz. Daha sonra, yetkilendirmenin değerini potansiyel olarak artırabilecek değişkenleri ele alıyoruz. Özellikle, daha yüksek belirsizlikle karşılaştıklarında veya çalışanların daha kesin bilgiler edinmelerinin mümkün olduğu ortamlarda firmaların yetkilendirme olasılıklarının arttığı hipotezini test ediyoruz. Bu analizde, belirsizliği ölçmek için piyasa koşullarını kullanırken, çalışanın edinebileceği bilgilerinin kesinliğini ölçmek için ise işçi üretkenliğini etkileyen değişkenleri kullanmaktayız.