Publication: Profiling in bargaining over college tuition
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Epple, Dennis
Romano, Richard
Sieg Holger
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Abstract
Profiling in college admissions arises when applicant attributes are given weight because they are correlated with unobservable student characteristics that the college values. The article models the admission process of a single college as a bargaining game between the college and a potential student with sequential moves and asymmetric information. We test the empirical implications of this model using a unique data set from a private college in the US. We find that the empirical evidence is consistent with the notion that signalling and profiling are important aspects of the college admission process.
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Oxford University Press
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Economic Journal
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DOI
10.1111/j.1468-0297.2006.01132.x
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