Publication: Naive realism and phenomenological directness: reply to Millar
Program
KU-Authors
KU Authors
Co-Authors
Editor & Affiliation
Compiler & Affiliation
Translator
Other Contributor
Date
Language
Type
Embargo Status
N/A
Journal Title
Journal ISSN
Volume Title
Alternative Title
Abstract
In this paper, I respond to Millar's recent criticism of na < ve realism. Millar provides several arguments for the thesis that there are powerful phenomenological grounds for preferring the content view (the view that to perceive is to represent the world to be a certain way) to na < ve realism (the view that to perceive is to stand in a primitive relation of acquaintance to the world). I intend to show that Millar's arguments are not convincing.
Source
Publisher
Springer
Subject
Philosophy, Phenomenology, Phenomenology of perception, Philosophical debate
Citation
Has Part
Source
Philosophical Studies
Book Series Title
Edition
DOI
10.1007/s11098-015-0583-1
item.page.datauri
Link
Rights
N/A