Publication: Naive realism and phenomenological directness: reply to Millar
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In this paper, I respond to Millar's recent criticism of na < ve realism. Millar provides several arguments for the thesis that there are powerful phenomenological grounds for preferring the content view (the view that to perceive is to represent the world to be a certain way) to na < ve realism (the view that to perceive is to stand in a primitive relation of acquaintance to the world). I intend to show that Millar's arguments are not convincing.
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Springer
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Philosophical Studies
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10.1007/s11098-015-0583-1
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