Publication:
Naive realism and phenomenological directness: reply to Millar

dc.contributor.departmentDepartment of Philosophy
dc.contributor.kuauthorDemircioğlu, Erhan
dc.contributor.kuprofileFaculty Member
dc.contributor.otherDepartment of Philosophy
dc.contributor.schoolcollegeinstituteCollege of Social Sciences and Humanities
dc.contributor.yokid193390
dc.date.accessioned2024-11-09T23:25:35Z
dc.date.issued2016
dc.description.abstractIn this paper, I respond to Millar's recent criticism of na < ve realism. Millar provides several arguments for the thesis that there are powerful phenomenological grounds for preferring the content view (the view that to perceive is to represent the world to be a certain way) to na < ve realism (the view that to perceive is to stand in a primitive relation of acquaintance to the world). I intend to show that Millar's arguments are not convincing.
dc.description.indexedbyWoS
dc.description.indexedbyScopus
dc.description.issue7
dc.description.openaccessNO
dc.description.publisherscopeInternational
dc.description.sponsoredbyTubitakEuN/A
dc.description.volume173
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/s11098-015-0583-1
dc.identifier.eissn1573-0883
dc.identifier.issn0031-8116
dc.identifier.quartileQ1
dc.identifier.scopus2-s2.0-84945208790
dc.identifier.urihttp://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11098-015-0583-1
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14288/11400
dc.identifier.wos377971700009
dc.keywordsPerception
dc.keywordsPhenomenology
dc.keywordsNaive realism
dc.keywordsContent view perception
dc.languageEnglish
dc.publisherSpringer
dc.sourcePhilosophical Studies
dc.subjectPhilosophy
dc.titleNaive realism and phenomenological directness: reply to Millar
dc.typeJournal Article
dspace.entity.typePublication
local.contributor.authorid0000-0002-1579-7505
local.contributor.kuauthorDemircioğlu, Erhan
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relation.isOrgUnitOfPublication.latestForDiscovery005b6224-491a-49b4-9afc-a4413d87712b

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