Buy-out of the oppressed minority's shares in joint stock companies: a comparative analysis of Turkish, Swiss and English law

Abstract

Article 531 of the Turkish Commercial Code grants the right to request corporate dissolution for just causes to shareholders representing at least 10% of the capital in joint stock companies, and 5% in publicly traded companies. In addition to dissolution, the court can order purchase of the claimant's shares at real value (buy-out remedy) or adopt a different solution. This article conducts an economic analysis of the buy-out remedy against minority oppression and compares Turkish law with Swiss and English legislation. The buy-out remedy is supposed to provide an ex post control on the controller's conduct, and it is expected to function as a put option conditional upon oppression. However, the current provision does not provide the expected incentives. Addressing this issue, I suggest that: (1) the relief sought by the claimant should be taken into account; (2) the purchaser of the claimant's shares should be the oppressive controller, rather than the company in question; (3) the standard of 'just cause' to be proven should not be equal for each remedy, and thus, the courts should be able to give a buy-out order even if the facts do not justify corporate dissolution; (4) dissolution orders should not be given in cases where there is a going-concern value to protect; and finally, (5) the valuation of the claimant's shares should, in principle, be made on a going concern and pro rata basis, and any depreciation of the claimant's shares due to the controller's abusive conducts should be taken into account.