Publication:
Kidney exchange: further utilization of donors via listed exchange

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Publication Date

2014

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English

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Journal Article

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Abstract

There is a set of incompatible patient-donor pairs and these pairs are matched pairwise. A match between two pairs corresponds to a paired kidney donation, where pairs exchange donated kidneys, or a paired listed exchange, where the first donor donates a kidney to the deceased donor wait-list, the first patient receives the kidney of the second donor, and the second patient receives a priority on the wait-list. We characterize the set of exchanges with the maximum number of transplants from the set of pairs. This characterization generalizes the well-known Gallai-Edmonds Decomposition Theorem.

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Journal of Mathematical Economics

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Elsevier

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Economics

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