<link rel="stylesheet" href="styles.f3b1fba60ec7970c.css">

Publication:
Nash implementation and tie-breaking rules

Loading...
Thumbnail Image

Departments

Item type:Organizational Unit,

School / College / Institute

Program

KU-Authors

Organization Authors

Co-Authors

N/A

Date

Language

Embargo Status

Journal Title

Journal ISSN

Volume Title

Alternative Title

Abstract

I analyze Nash implementation when agents might use an exogenous tie-breaking rule to choose among the messages they are materially indifferent between. If the planner is endowed with the knowledge of the rule, this might expand or shrink the set of implementable social choice correspondences depending on the particular rule used by the agents. If the planner is not endowed with the knowledge of the rule, then the problem of implementation is almost equivalent to double implementation in Nash and strict Nash equilibrium.

Source

Publisher

Academic Press Inc Elsevier Science

Citation

item.page.haspartof

Source

Games and Economic Behavior

item.page.ispartofseries

item.page.edition

DOI

10.1016/j.geb.2016.12.003

item.page.datauri

item.page.link

Rights

Copyrights Note

Endorsement

Review

Supplemented By

Referenced By

Related Patent

Related Goal

Item type:Goal, Access status: Open Access ,
16 - Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions
Compassion and a strong moral compass is essential to every democratic society.Yet, persecution, injustice and abuse still runs rampant and is tearing at the very fabric of civilization. We must ensure that we have strong institutions, global standards of justice, and a commitment to peace everywhere.
Google Scholar
Scholar'da Ara ↗
Altmetric
Dimensions
PlumX Metrikleri
BIP! Indicators