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Can pre-arranged matches be avoided in two-sided matching markets?

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dc.contributor.departmentDepartment of Economics
dc.contributor.departmentDepartment of Economics
dc.contributor.kuauthorSönmez, Tayfun
dc.contributor.kuprofileFaculty Member
dc.contributor.schoolcollegeinstituteCollege of Administrative Sciences and Economics
dc.contributor.yokidN/A
dc.date.accessioned2024-11-09T23:18:38Z
dc.date.issued1999
dc.description.abstractWe study manipulation via pre-arranged matches in the context of centralized two-sided matching markets. We show that the solution that is used to match the hospitals and medical residents in the United States, namely the hospital-optimal stable rule, is manipulable in this way. Unfortunately this is a general problem: We show that there is no solution that is both stable and non-manipulable.
dc.description.indexedbyWoS
dc.description.indexedbyScopus
dc.description.issue1
dc.description.openaccessNO
dc.description.publisherscopeInternational
dc.description.volume86
dc.identifier.doi10.1006/jeth.1999.2507
dc.identifier.issn0022-0531
dc.identifier.quartileQ3
dc.identifier.scopus2-s2.0-0039775308
dc.identifier.urihttp://dx.doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1999.2507
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14288/10416
dc.identifier.wos80504000007
dc.keywordsNatural experiment
dc.keywordsManipilation
dc.languageEnglish
dc.publisherAcademic Press Inc
dc.sourceJournal of Economic Theory
dc.subjectEconomics
dc.titleCan pre-arranged matches be avoided in two-sided matching markets?
dc.typeJournal Article
dspace.entity.typePublication
local.contributor.authorid0000-0002-9153-0466
local.contributor.kuauthorSönmez, Tayfun
relation.isOrgUnitOfPublication7ad2a3bb-d8d9-4cbd-a6a3-3ca4b30b40c3
relation.isOrgUnitOfPublication.latestForDiscovery7ad2a3bb-d8d9-4cbd-a6a3-3ca4b30b40c3

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