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Can pre-arranged matches be avoided in two-sided matching markets?

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We study manipulation via pre-arranged matches in the context of centralized two-sided matching markets. We show that the solution that is used to match the hospitals and medical residents in the United States, namely the hospital-optimal stable rule, is manipulable in this way. Unfortunately this is a general problem: We show that there is no solution that is both stable and non-manipulable.

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Academic Press Inc

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Economics

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Journal of Economic Theory

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10.1006/jeth.1999.2507

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