Publication: Verifiability and contract enforcement: a model with judicial moral hazard
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Abstract
I model the litigation of a contract containing a variable not observable by courts, hence nonverifiable, unless the rational and self-interested judge exerts effort. He values the correct ruling but dislikes effort. Judicial effort is discretionary. I show that effort cost is inconsequential-"always breach" is equilibrium for any effort cost. But there exists another equilibrium where a small breach rate is achieved even with significant effort costs. Maximal remedies for breach are not optimal. Because effort is discretionary, low effort cost increases breach. Pretrial negotiations can have a substantial negative impact on verifiability under arbitrarily small deviations from full rationality.
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Publisher
Oxford University Press (OUP) inc
Subject
Economics, Law
Citation
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Source
Journal of Law Economics and Organization
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DOI
10.1093/jleo/18.1.67