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Verifiability and contract enforcement: a model with judicial moral hazard

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I model the litigation of a contract containing a variable not observable by courts, hence nonverifiable, unless the rational and self-interested judge exerts effort. He values the correct ruling but dislikes effort. Judicial effort is discretionary. I show that effort cost is inconsequential-"always breach" is equilibrium for any effort cost. But there exists another equilibrium where a small breach rate is achieved even with significant effort costs. Maximal remedies for breach are not optimal. Because effort is discretionary, low effort cost increases breach. Pretrial negotiations can have a substantial negative impact on verifiability under arbitrarily small deviations from full rationality.

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Oxford University Press (OUP) inc

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Economics, Law

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Journal of Law Economics and Organization

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10.1093/jleo/18.1.67

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