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An experimental study of house allocation mechanisms

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dc.contributor.coauthorChen, Yan
dc.contributor.departmentDepartment of Economics
dc.contributor.departmentDepartment of Economics
dc.contributor.kuauthorSönmez, Tayfun
dc.contributor.kuprofileFaculty Member
dc.contributor.schoolcollegeinstituteCollege of Administrative Sciences and Economics
dc.contributor.yokidN/A
dc.date.accessioned2024-11-09T23:49:34Z
dc.date.issued2004
dc.description.abstractWe report an experiment on three house allocation mechanisms under complete information: random serial dictatorship with squatting rights, and two variants of the top trading cycles mechanism. Results show that the latter two are significantly more efficient than the former.
dc.description.indexedbyWoS
dc.description.indexedbyScopus
dc.description.issue1
dc.description.openaccessNO
dc.description.publisherscopeInternational
dc.description.volume83
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.econlet.2003.10.012
dc.identifier.eissn1873-7374
dc.identifier.issn0165-1765
dc.identifier.quartileQ3
dc.identifier.scopus2-s2.0-1342290464
dc.identifier.urihttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2003.10.012
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14288/14384
dc.identifier.wos220277500020
dc.keywordsHouse allocation
dc.keywordsMechanism design
dc.languageEnglish
dc.publisherElsevier Science Sa
dc.sourceEconomics Letters
dc.subjectEconomics
dc.titleAn experimental study of house allocation mechanisms
dc.typeJournal Article
dspace.entity.typePublication
local.contributor.authorid0000-0002-9153-0466
local.contributor.kuauthorSönmez, Tayfun
relation.isOrgUnitOfPublication7ad2a3bb-d8d9-4cbd-a6a3-3ca4b30b40c3
relation.isOrgUnitOfPublication.latestForDiscovery7ad2a3bb-d8d9-4cbd-a6a3-3ca4b30b40c3

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