Publication: An experimental study of house allocation mechanisms
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Chen, Yan
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Abstract
We report an experiment on three house allocation mechanisms under complete information: random serial dictatorship with squatting rights, and two variants of the top trading cycles mechanism. Results show that the latter two are significantly more efficient than the former.
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Elsevier
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Economics Letters
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DOI
10.1016/j.econlet.2003.10.012
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