Publication: Optimal debt contracts with renegotiation
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Abstract
This paper studies the role of debt in committing a seller not to trade at a low price. We consider a discrete-time finite-horizon buyer-seller relationship. the seller makes an upfront relationship-specific investment, which is financed with debt. Debt then is repaid gradually to mitigate the hold-up risk. Even though debt is renegotiable, under the assumption that with a small probability renegotiation may fail and may lead to inefficient liquidation, debt still can be used as a commitment device. We solve for renegotiation proof dynamic debt contracts that are optimal for the seller and show that debt is repaid over the entire course of the relationship with declining repayments.
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M I T Press
Subject
Economics, Management
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Journal of Economics and Management Strategy
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DOI
10.1111/j.1430-9134.2004.00031.x