Publication: Uncertainty resolution and strategic trade policy in oligopolistic industries
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Abstract
This paper investigates a government's choice of strategic trade policy when the domestic firm observes a private noisy signal about the stochastic market demand while in competition with a rival firm. The government chooses between quantity controls and subsidies to maximize profits of the domestic firm. Assuming that firms compete a la Cournot in a third country, it is shown that the optimal trade policy depends not only on demand uncertainty but also on the predictability of the true market demand by the firms.
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Blackwell Publishing Ltd
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Review of International Economics
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10.1111/1467-9396.00223
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