An experimental investigation of voter myopia in economic evaluations

Abstract

A prevalent assumption in the economic voting literature is that voters' retrospective evaluations are based on very recent outcomes only, that is, they are myopic. I test this assumption by drawing on a population based survey experiment from Turkey. Turkey presents a good opportunity to explore voters' time horizons for economic voting: the long tenure of the same single-party government entailed periods of both good and poor performance, and its overall record to date has been better than its immediate predecessors. I find that voters can provide divergent assessments of incumbent's performance in managing the economy over different time periods that are in line with the country's macroeconomic trajectory. Moreover, voters' evaluations of the incumbent's performance during its entire tenure have a stronger effect on economic vote than their shorter term evaluations, defying voter myopia. I provide evidence that long-term outcomes might weigh heavier in voters' considerations than commonly assumed.