Publication: Unequal peace
Program
KU-Authors
KU Authors
Co-Authors
Zheng, Charles Z.
Publication Date
Language
Type
Embargo Status
Journal Title
Journal ISSN
Volume Title
Alternative Title
Abstract
A mediator proposes a settlement between two contestants to avoid a conflict where the cost each contestant bears is inversely related to the contestant's privately known strength. Their strength levels are identically distributed, and their welfares weigh equally in the mediator's objective. However, the optimal proposal offers one contestant much more than it does the other so that the former accepts it always, whereas the latter only occasionally. This unequal treatment improves the prospect of peace by making one contestant willing to settle without fearing that the action signals his weakness that his opponent can exploit should conflict occur.
Source
Publisher
Wiley
Subject
Economics
Citation
Has Part
Source
International Economic Review
Book Series Title
Edition
DOI
10.1111/iere.12725