Publication: Disclosure of status in an agency setting
Program
KU-Authors
KU Authors
Co-Authors
Marino, Anthony M.
Publication Date
Language
Type
Embargo Status
Journal Title
Journal ISSN
Volume Title
Alternative Title
Abstract
We develop a model in which the principal and the agent share private information about the value of the agent for a multi-agent organization. The principal can disclose private information and make public the relative standing or status of all agents in the organization. We study whether it is better in terms of profit and utility to disclose or to not disclose status to the group of agents. Conditions for the optimality of disclosure versus non-disclosure are characterized for the cases of exogenous and endogenous human capital.
Source
Publisher
Elsevier Science Bv
Subject
Economics
Citation
Has Part
Source
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
Book Series Title
Edition
DOI
10.1016/j.jebo.2014.05.002