Publication:
Disclosure of status in an agency setting

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Marino, Anthony M.

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Abstract

We develop a model in which the principal and the agent share private information about the value of the agent for a multi-agent organization. The principal can disclose private information and make public the relative standing or status of all agents in the organization. We study whether it is better in terms of profit and utility to disclose or to not disclose status to the group of agents. Conditions for the optimality of disclosure versus non-disclosure are characterized for the cases of exogenous and endogenous human capital.

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Elsevier Science Bv

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Economics

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Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization

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10.1016/j.jebo.2014.05.002

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