Publication:
The role of verifiability and privacy in the strategic provision of performance feedback: theory and experimental evidence

dc.contributor.coauthorOzdemir, Duygu
dc.contributor.departmentDepartment of Economics
dc.contributor.kuauthorErtaç, Seda
dc.contributor.kuauthorKoçkesen, Levent
dc.contributor.schoolcollegeinstituteCollege of Administrative Sciences and Economics
dc.date.accessioned2024-11-10T00:09:00Z
dc.date.issued2016
dc.description.abstractWe theoretically and experimentally analyze the role of verifiability and privacy in strategic performance feedback using a "one principal-two agent" context with real effort. We confirm the theoretical prediction that information transmission occurs only in verifiable feedback mechanisms and private-verifiable feedback is the most informative mechanism. Yet, subjects also exhibit some behavior that cannot be explained by our baseline model, such as telling the truth even when this will definitely hurt them, interpreting "no feedback" more optimistically than they should, and being influenced by feedback given to the other agent. We show that a model with individual-specific lying costs and naive agents can account for some, but not all, of these findings. We conclude that although agents do take into account the principal's strategic behavior to form beliefs in a Bayesian fashion, they are overly optimistic and interpret positive feedback to the other agent more pessimistically than they should. (C) 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
dc.description.indexedbyWOS
dc.description.indexedbyScopus
dc.description.openaccessYES
dc.description.publisherscopeInternational
dc.description.sponsoredbyTubitakEuN/A
dc.description.sponsorshipScientific and Technological Research Council of Turkey (TUBITAK) [111K444]
dc.description.sponsorshipTurkish Academy of the Sciences
dc.description.sponsorshipEconomic and Social Research Council [1366876] Funding Source: researchfish We thank David Gill, two anonymous referees, and the advisory editor for their comments and suggestions and Ayca Ebru Giritligil for making the BELLS laboratory available for our experiments. Ertac thanks The Scientific and Technological Research Council of Turkey (TUBITAK) for generous funding (Grant No. 111K444) for the experiments in this paper, and the Turkish Academy of the Sciences for general financial support.
dc.description.volume100
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.geb.2016.08.009
dc.identifier.eissn1090-2473
dc.identifier.issn0899-8256
dc.identifier.scopus2-s2.0-84989283175
dc.identifier.urihttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2016.08.009
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14288/17055
dc.identifier.wos390503900002
dc.keywordsLab experiments
dc.keywordsPerformance feedback
dc.keywordsStrategic communication
dc.keywordsCheap talk
dc.keywordsDisclosure
dc.keywordsPersuasion
dc.keywordsMultiple audiences
dc.keywordsLying information-transmission
dc.keywordsCheap talk
dc.keywordsCommunication
dc.keywordsDeception
dc.keywordsDisclosure
dc.keywordsGames
dc.keywordsLies
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherAcademic Press Inc Elsevier Science
dc.relation.ispartofGames and Economic Behavior
dc.subjectEconomics
dc.titleThe role of verifiability and privacy in the strategic provision of performance feedback: theory and experimental evidence
dc.typeJournal Article
dspace.entity.typePublication
local.contributor.kuauthorErtaç, Seda
local.contributor.kuauthorKoçkesen, Levent
local.publication.orgunit1College of Administrative Sciences and Economics
local.publication.orgunit2Department of Economics
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relation.isParentOrgUnitOfPublication.latestForDiscovery972aa199-81e2-499f-908e-6fa3deca434a

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