Publication: The role of verifiability and privacy in the strategic provision of performance feedback: theory and experimental evidence
dc.contributor.coauthor | Ozdemir, Duygu | |
dc.contributor.department | Department of Economics | |
dc.contributor.kuauthor | Ertaç, Seda | |
dc.contributor.kuauthor | Koçkesen, Levent | |
dc.contributor.schoolcollegeinstitute | College of Administrative Sciences and Economics | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2024-11-10T00:09:00Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2016 | |
dc.description.abstract | We theoretically and experimentally analyze the role of verifiability and privacy in strategic performance feedback using a "one principal-two agent" context with real effort. We confirm the theoretical prediction that information transmission occurs only in verifiable feedback mechanisms and private-verifiable feedback is the most informative mechanism. Yet, subjects also exhibit some behavior that cannot be explained by our baseline model, such as telling the truth even when this will definitely hurt them, interpreting "no feedback" more optimistically than they should, and being influenced by feedback given to the other agent. We show that a model with individual-specific lying costs and naive agents can account for some, but not all, of these findings. We conclude that although agents do take into account the principal's strategic behavior to form beliefs in a Bayesian fashion, they are overly optimistic and interpret positive feedback to the other agent more pessimistically than they should. (C) 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. | |
dc.description.indexedby | WOS | |
dc.description.indexedby | Scopus | |
dc.description.openaccess | YES | |
dc.description.publisherscope | International | |
dc.description.sponsoredbyTubitakEu | N/A | |
dc.description.sponsorship | Scientific and Technological Research Council of Turkey (TUBITAK) [111K444] | |
dc.description.sponsorship | Turkish Academy of the Sciences | |
dc.description.sponsorship | Economic and Social Research Council [1366876] Funding Source: researchfish We thank David Gill, two anonymous referees, and the advisory editor for their comments and suggestions and Ayca Ebru Giritligil for making the BELLS laboratory available for our experiments. Ertac thanks The Scientific and Technological Research Council of Turkey (TUBITAK) for generous funding (Grant No. 111K444) for the experiments in this paper, and the Turkish Academy of the Sciences for general financial support. | |
dc.description.volume | 100 | |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1016/j.geb.2016.08.009 | |
dc.identifier.eissn | 1090-2473 | |
dc.identifier.issn | 0899-8256 | |
dc.identifier.scopus | 2-s2.0-84989283175 | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2016.08.009 | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14288/17055 | |
dc.identifier.wos | 390503900002 | |
dc.keywords | Lab experiments | |
dc.keywords | Performance feedback | |
dc.keywords | Strategic communication | |
dc.keywords | Cheap talk | |
dc.keywords | Disclosure | |
dc.keywords | Persuasion | |
dc.keywords | Multiple audiences | |
dc.keywords | Lying information-transmission | |
dc.keywords | Cheap talk | |
dc.keywords | Communication | |
dc.keywords | Deception | |
dc.keywords | Disclosure | |
dc.keywords | Games | |
dc.keywords | Lies | |
dc.language.iso | eng | |
dc.publisher | Academic Press Inc Elsevier Science | |
dc.relation.ispartof | Games and Economic Behavior | |
dc.subject | Economics | |
dc.title | The role of verifiability and privacy in the strategic provision of performance feedback: theory and experimental evidence | |
dc.type | Journal Article | |
dspace.entity.type | Publication | |
local.contributor.kuauthor | Ertaç, Seda | |
local.contributor.kuauthor | Koçkesen, Levent | |
local.publication.orgunit1 | College of Administrative Sciences and Economics | |
local.publication.orgunit2 | Department of Economics | |
relation.isOrgUnitOfPublication | 7ad2a3bb-d8d9-4cbd-a6a3-3ca4b30b40c3 | |
relation.isOrgUnitOfPublication.latestForDiscovery | 7ad2a3bb-d8d9-4cbd-a6a3-3ca4b30b40c3 | |
relation.isParentOrgUnitOfPublication | 972aa199-81e2-499f-908e-6fa3deca434a | |
relation.isParentOrgUnitOfPublication.latestForDiscovery | 972aa199-81e2-499f-908e-6fa3deca434a |