<link rel="stylesheet" href="styles.f3b1fba60ec7970c.css">

Publication:
The role of verifiability and privacy in the strategic provision of performance feedback: theory and experimental evidence

Loading...
Thumbnail Image

Departments

Item type:Organizational Unit,

School / College / Institute

Program

Organization Authors

Co-Authors

Ozdemir, Duygu

Date

Language

Embargo Status

N/A

Journal Title

Journal ISSN

Volume Title

Alternative Title

Abstract

We theoretically and experimentally analyze the role of verifiability and privacy in strategic performance feedback using a "one principal-two agent" context with real effort. We confirm the theoretical prediction that information transmission occurs only in verifiable feedback mechanisms and private-verifiable feedback is the most informative mechanism. Yet, subjects also exhibit some behavior that cannot be explained by our baseline model, such as telling the truth even when this will definitely hurt them, interpreting "no feedback" more optimistically than they should, and being influenced by feedback given to the other agent. We show that a model with individual-specific lying costs and naive agents can account for some, but not all, of these findings. We conclude that although agents do take into account the principal's strategic behavior to form beliefs in a Bayesian fashion, they are overly optimistic and interpret positive feedback to the other agent more pessimistically than they should. (C) 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Source

Publisher

Academic Press Inc Elsevier Science

Citation

item.page.haspartof

Source

Games and Economic Behavior

item.page.ispartofseries

item.page.edition

DOI

10.1016/j.geb.2016.08.009

item.page.datauri

item.page.link

Rights

N/A

Copyrights Note

Rights and licensing

N/A

Endorsement

Review

Supplemented By

Referenced By

Related Patent

Related Goal

Google Scholar
Scholar'da Ara ↗
Altmetric
Dimensions
PlumX Metrikleri
BIP! Indicators