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Permanent URI for this collectionhttps://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14288/3
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Publication Metadata only Marxism and/as black theology:from cone to west and back again(Routledge Journals, Taylor & Francis Ltd, 2024) Department of Philosophy; Brown, Derek; Department of Philosophy; College of Social Sciences and HumanitiesThis paper argues three primary points. First, that James Cone analytically relied on and supported Marxist political economy, especially as concerns its use as an explanation of anti-Black racism. Second, that this Marxist dimension of Cone's work should be supported, because Marxism remains the most effective political and analytical tool for improving the material conditions of the exploited. Third, that despite his analytical adherence to Marxism as an explanatory theory for understanding and overcoming racism, Cone did not analytically clarify the structural relationship between race and class. This conflation becomes problematic for Cone's project when class differences and wealth inequality within the Black community - and every "community" - are exacerbated. This shortcoming can be redressed by Cone's interlocutor Cornel West, who offers a Marxist understanding of the relationship between race and class that allows him to pursue an emancipatory politics that is committed to both anti-racism and anti-capitalism.Publication Metadata only Auto-affection and ethics(ROUTLEDGE JOURNALS, TAYLOR & FRANCIS LTD, 2024) Department of Philosophy; Direk, Zeynep; Department of Philosophy; College of Social Sciences and HumanitiesThis essay starts with the possibility of situating Derrida's aporetic ethics in the domain of normative ethics and argues that Derrida's reflection on ethics is enrooted in the specific way he conceives the phenomenological notion of auto-affection. In the second section, I analyze, in the early work, auto-affection with signs and show its centrality in Derrida's first encounter with Levinas's philosophy. Derrida refuses to substitute the hetero-affective relation to the Other for auto-affection as the source of universal law and normativity. He does not sacrifice universality and tackles the problem of autonomous ethical decision-making even though he welcomes through affectivity the signification of the singular other, which is irreducible to conceptual, emotive, and normative self-relation. This background helps us understand the rootedness of ethical aporias in a reflection on auto-affection.Publication Metadata only Between Socrates and Kant. Thinking and sensus communis in Arendt's conception of the banality of evil(Edizioni Ets, 2017) Department of Philosophy; Roney, Patrick; Faculty Member; Department of Philosophy; College of Social Sciences and Humanities; N/AThe aim of this paper is to show how Hannah Arendt develops her concept of the banality of evil through a phenomenological appropriation of Kant's theory of judgment and of the principle of sensus communis in particular. Even though Arendt initially defined the banality of evil as a form of thoughtlessness grounded upon her understanding of thinking as an inner dialogue with one's 'other' self, I argue that she develops the concept much more extensively in relation to Kant's doctrine of reflective judgment and the possibility of a sensus communis as a pre-conceptual model of unforced consensus for the public space. I further argue that her reading of Kant is carried out together with both an existential-ontological re-appraisal of appearances and its relation to the transcendental imagination. Through the emphasis on the sensus communis, the banality of evil can then be re-defined as a refusal of the same.Publication Metadata only Sloterdijk’s anthropotechnics(Routledge Journals, Taylor & Francis Ltd, 2021) Roney, Patrick; Department of Philosophy; Rossi, Andrea; Teaching Faculty; Department of Philosophy; College of Social Sciences and Humanities; N/AN/APublication Metadata only Consciousness as objective activity: a historical-genetic approach(Guilford Publications Inc, 2011) Department of Philosophy; Azeri, Siyaveş; Faculty Member; Department of Philosophy; College of Social Sciences and Humanities; N/AMental phenomena and consciousness can be located in sign and in language. Since these latter belong to the objective world of human interaction, consciousness emerges as a part of objectivity. A sign is the product of the interaction between consciousnesses. Thus, admitting the existence of the sign presumes the existence of action. Activity is a social phenomenon; thus, it is objective. It is the objectivization of human needs and desires as production and reproduction of these needs in society. Human consciousness emerges as co-knowing or co-consciousness through linguistic activity. Consciousness as co-knowing emphasizes the genesis of human subjectivity not as a mere assertion but as something the existence of which is to be shown. Consciousness and selfhood, thus, appear as objective, mediating but subjective action. In this view, the self is emancipated consciousness. Therefore, the psyche emerges as the subjective image of objectivity.Publication Metadata only What is the moral of davidson's carbon copier? Towards an anscombean account of practical knowledge(Routledge, 2022) N/A; Department of Philosophy; Özaltun, Eylem; Faculty Member; Department of Philosophy; College of Social Sciences and Humanities; 219281N/APublication Metadata only Conditional uniqueness(inst Philosophy Slovak acad Sciences and inst Philosophy Czech acad Sciences, 2022) Department of Philosophy; Demircioğlu, Erhan; Faculty Member; Department of Philosophy; College of Social Sciences and Humanities; 193390in this paper, I aim to do three things. First, I introduce the distinction between the Uniqueness thesis (U) and what I call the Conditional Uniqueness thesis (U*). Second, I argue that despite their official advertisements, some prominent uniquers effectively defend U* rather than U. Third, some influential considerations that have been raised by the opponents of U misfire if they are interpreted as against U*. the moral is that an appreciation of the distinction between U and U* helps to clarify the contours of the uniqueness debate and to avoid a good deal of talking past each other.Publication Metadata only Can we "effectivize" spacetime?(Elsevier Sci Ltd, 2022) Department of Philosophy; Chen, Lu; Faculty Member; Department of Philosophy; College of Social Sciences and Humanities; 329122According to effective realism, scientific theories give us knowledge about the unobservable world, but not at the fundamental level. This view is supported by the well-received effective -field-theory (EFT) approach to high energy physics, according to which even our most successful physical theories are only applicable up to a certain energy scale and expected to break down beyond that. In this paper, I advance new challenges for effective realism and the EFT approach. I argue that effective quantum gravity (EQG) does not give us a realistic theory of spacetime even within its scope of validity. This also exposes a general interpretative dilemma faced by all EFTs concerning their indispensable references to classical spacetime beyond their scope of validity.Publication Metadata only Reasons, rationalization, and rationality(Springer) Department of Philosophy; Demircioğlu, Erhan; Faculty Member; Department of Philosophy; College of Social Sciences and Humanities; 193390In this paper, I provide an answer to the question "what is it for a reason to be the reason for which a belief is held?" After arguing against the causal account of the reason-for-which connection, I present what I call the rationalization account, according to which a reason R a subject S has for a belief P is the reason for which S holds P just in case R is the premise in S's rationalization for P, where the argument from R to P becomes S's rationalization in virtue of her endorsing it. In order to bring explicitly into view the version of the rationalization account I aim to argue for, I draw two distinctions, one between occurrent and dispositional endorsement and the other between personal and public endorsement. I show that the version of the rationalization account thus clarified receives intuitive support from various cases and survives some formidable objections that might be tempting to level against it.Publication Metadata only On an argument from analogy for the possibility of human cognitive closure(Springer, 2016) Department of Philosophy; Demircioğlu, Erhan; Faculty Member; Department of Philosophy; College of Social Sciences and Humanities; 193390In this paper, I aim to show that McGinn's argument from analogy for the possibility of human cognitive closure survives the critique raised on separate occasions by Dennett and Kriegel. I will distinguish between linguistic and non-linguistic cognitive closure and argue that the analogy argument from animal non-linguistic cognitive closure goes untouched by the objection Dennett and Kriegel raises.