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Monetary rewards in employee referral programs

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This paper examines the conditions under which employee referrals serve as a screening function when there is a conflict of interest between the firm and the current employees concerning referral recruitment. In particular, I consider two potential mechanisms that lead to a conflict of interest: the employee's social connection with the applicant and her promotion prospects. Specifically, I posit that the employee will have an incentive to refer low-ability applicants if she has a strong social connection with them or if she faces the possibility of competing against her own referral to earn a promotion at the firm. Taking these potential sources for conflicting interests, I investigate the extent to which the firm can make use of financial incentives (fixed fees and bonuses) to align incentives of the employee with those of the firm.

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Wiley

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Economics

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Manchester School

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10.1111/manc.12389

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