Publication: Core in a simple coalition formation game
Loading...
Program
KU-Authors
Organization Authors
Co-Authors
Banerjee, Suryapratim
Konishi, Hideo
Date
Language
Type
Embargo Status
N/A
Journal Title
Journal ISSN
Volume Title
Alternative Title
Abstract
We analyze the core of a class of coalition formation game in which every player's payoff depends only on the members of her coalition. We first consider anonymous games and additively separable games. Neither of these strong properties guarantee the existence of a core allocation, even if additional strong properties are imposed. We then introduce two top-coalition properties each of which guarantee the existence. We show that these properties are independent of the Scarf-balancedness condition. Finally we give several economic applications.
Source
Publisher
Springer
Citation
item.page.haspartof
Source
Social Choice and Welfare
item.page.ispartofseries
item.page.edition
DOI
10.1007/s003550000067
item.page.datauri
item.page.link
Rights
N/A
Copyrights Note
Rights and licensing
N/A
