Publication: A two-sided reputation result with long-run players
Program
KU-Authors
KU Authors
Co-Authors
Ekmekçi, Mehmet
Publication Date
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Type
Embargo Status
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Abstract
We establish reputation results, under two sided incomplete information, for a class of repeated games. We consider a repeated game that satisfies the assumptions of either Atakan and Ekmekci (2012) [3] or Cripps et al. (2005) [6] and we assume that both players are Stackelberg types with positive probability. If the stage game is not a common interest game, then equilibrium play converges to the unique equilibrium of a continuous time war of attrition as the stage game is repeated arbitrarily frequently. Alternatively, if the stage game is a common-interest game, then the players' equilibrium payoffs converge to their highest payoffs as the stage game is repeated arbitrarily frequently. (C) 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Source
Publisher
Academic Press Inc Elsevier Science
Subject
Economics
Citation
Has Part
Source
Journal of Economic Theory
Book Series Title
Edition
DOI
10.1016/j.jet.2012.12.007