Publication: The manipulability of matching rules via segmentation
Program
KU-Authors
KU Authors
Co-Authors
Özkal Sanver, İpek
Publication Date
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Type
Embargo Status
Journal Title
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Volume Title
Alternative Title
Abstract
Our matching problems feature agents with endowments facing certain division rules. At any matching, the endowments of agents are reallocated between the matched pairs according to some given division rule, and this opens doors to an iterated matching problem and rematching, and to manipulation of some matching rules via segmentation. In this form of manipulation a coalition breaks off from the rest, matches within itself and rejoins the complementary coalition for a rematching at the new endowment profile. Under certain division rules this may benefit the coalition who breaks off without hurting the complementary coalition. Furthermore, both may benefit by first matching internally and then rejoining for a new match.
Source
Publisher
Springer Nature
Subject
Economics
Citation
Has Part
Source
Economic Theory
Book Series Title
Edition
DOI
10.1007/s00199-005-0064-4