<link rel="stylesheet" href="styles.f3b1fba60ec7970c.css">

Publication:
Bargaining over a finite set of alternatives

Loading...
Thumbnail Image

Departments

Item type:Organizational Unit,

School / College / Institute

Program

Organization Authors

Co-Authors

Kıbrıs, Özgür

Date

Language

Embargo Status

N/A

Journal Title

Journal ISSN

Volume Title

Alternative Title

Abstract

We analyze bilateral bargaining over a finite set of alternatives. We look for "good" ordinal solutions to such problems and show that Unanimity Compromise and Rational Compromise are the only bargaining rules that satisfy a basic set of properties. We then extend our analysis to admit problems with countably infinite alternatives. We show that, on this class, no bargaining rule choosing finite subsets of alternatives can be neutral. When rephrased in the utility framework of Nash (1950), this implies that there is no ordinal bargaining rule that is finite-valued.

Source

Publisher

Springer

Citation

item.page.haspartof

Source

Social Choice and Welfare

item.page.ispartofseries

item.page.edition

DOI

10.1007/s00355-006-0178-z

item.page.datauri

item.page.link

Rights

N/A

Copyrights Note

Rights and licensing

N/A

Endorsement

Review

Supplemented By

Referenced By

Related Patent

Related Goal

Item type:Goal, Access status: Open Access ,
16 - Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions
Compassion and a strong moral compass is essential to every democratic society.Yet, persecution, injustice and abuse still runs rampant and is tearing at the very fabric of civilization. We must ensure that we have strong institutions, global standards of justice, and a commitment to peace everywhere.
Google Scholar
Scholar'da Ara ↗
Altmetric
Dimensions
PlumX Metrikleri
BIP! Indicators