Publication: Market selection and the information content of prices
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Ekmekçi, Mehmet
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NO
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Abstract
We study information aggregation when n bidders choose, based on their private information, between two concurrent common-value auctions. There are k(s) identical objects on sale through a uniform-price auction in market s and there are an additional k(r) objects on auction in market r, which is identical to market s except for a positive reserve price. The reserve price in market r implies that information is not aggregated in this market. Moreover, if the object-to-bidder ratio in market s exceeds a certain cutoff, then information is not aggregated in market s either. Conversely, if the object-to-bidder ratio is less than this cutoff, then information is aggregated in market s as the market grows arbitrarily large. Our results demonstrate how frictions in one market can disrupt information aggregation in a linked, frictionless market because of the pattern of market selection by imperfectly informed bidders.
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Publisher
Wiley
Subject
Economics, Mathematics, Social sciences, Mathematical methods, Statistics and probability
Citation
Has Part
Source
Econometrica
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Edition
DOI
10.3982/ECTA14935