Publication: School choice: an experimental study
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Chen, Yan
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Abstract
We present an experimental study of three school choice mechanisms. The Boston mechanism is influential in practice, while the Gale-Shapley and Top Trading Cycles mechanisms have superior theoretical properties. Consistent with theory, this study indicates a high preference manipulation rate under Boston. As a result, efficiency under Boston is significantly lower than that of the two competing mechanisms in the designed environment. However, contrary to theory, Gale-Shapley outperforms Top Trading Cycles and generates the highest efficiency. Our results suggest that replacing the Boston mechanism with either Gale-Shapley or Top Trading Cycles mechanism might significantly improve efficiency.
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Academic Press Inc Elsevier Science
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Source
Journal of Economic Theory
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DOI
10.1016/j.jet.2004.10.006
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