Publication: Reputation in long-run relationships
Program
KU-Authors
KU Authors
Co-Authors
Ekmekci, Mehmet
Publication Date
Language
Type
Embargo Status
Journal Title
Journal ISSN
Volume Title
Alternative Title
Abstract
We model a long-run relationship as an infinitely repeated game played by two equally patient agents. In each period, the agents play an extensive-form stage game of perfect information with either locally non-conflicting interests or strictly conflicting interests. There is incomplete information about the type of Player 1, while Player 2's type is commonly known. We show that a sufficiently patient Player 1 can leverage Player 2's uncertainty about his type to secure his highest pay-off, compatible with Player 2's individual rationality, in any perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the repeated game.
Source
Publisher
Oxford Univ Press
Subject
Economics
Citation
Has Part
Source
Review of Economic Studies
Book Series Title
Edition
DOI
10.1093/restud/rdr037