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Reputation in long-run relationships

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Ekmekci, Mehmet

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We model a long-run relationship as an infinitely repeated game played by two equally patient agents. In each period, the agents play an extensive-form stage game of perfect information with either locally non-conflicting interests or strictly conflicting interests. There is incomplete information about the type of Player 1, while Player 2's type is commonly known. We show that a sufficiently patient Player 1 can leverage Player 2's uncertainty about his type to secure his highest pay-off, compatible with Player 2's individual rationality, in any perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the repeated game.

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Oxford Univ Press

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Economics

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Review of Economic Studies

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10.1093/restud/rdr037

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