Publication: Auctions, actions, and the failure of information aggregation
Program
KU-Authors
KU Authors
Co-Authors
Ekmekci, Mehmet
Publication Date
Language
Type
Embargo Status
Journal Title
Journal ISSN
Volume Title
Alternative Title
Abstract
We study a uniform-price auction where k identical common-value objects are allocated amongst z > k bidders who have imperfect signals about the state of the world. The common valuation is determined jointly by the state and an action that is chosen after winning an object. In large auctions, there are symmetric equilibria where the auction price aggregates no information. Moreover, market statistics other than price (e.g., the amount of rationing or the bid distribution) contain extra information about the state. In contrast, in standard large auctions without actions, the price aggregates all relevant information.
Source
Publisher
Amer Economic Assoc
Subject
Economics
Citation
Has Part
Source
American Economic Review
Book Series Title
Edition
DOI
10.1257/aer.104.7.2014