Research Outputs
Permanent URI for this communityhttps://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14288/2
Browse
42 results
Search Results
Publication Metadata only A referential theory of truth and falsity(Taylor and Francis, 2022) N/A; İnan, Halit İlhan; N/A; N/A; N/AMost of the philosophical literature on truth concentrates on certain ontological and epistemic problems. This book focuses instead on language. By utilizing the Fregean idea that sentences are singular referring expressions, the author develops novel connections between the philosophical study of truth and falsity and the huge literature in in the philosophy of language on the notion of reference. The first part of the book constructs the author's theory and argues for it in length. Part II addresses the ways in which the theory relates to, and is different from, some of the basic theories of truth. Part III takes up how to account for the truth of sentences with logical operators and quantifiers. Finally, Part IV discusses the applications and implications of the theory for longstanding problems in philosophy of language, metaphysics, and epistemology.Publication Metadata only Against phylogenetic conceptions of race(Springer, 2023) N/A; Academic Writing Program; Osmanoğlu, Kamuran; Teaching Faculty; Academic Writing Program; College of Social Sciences and Humanities; 320685Biological racial realism (BRR) continues to be a much-discussed topic, with several recent papers presenting arguments for the plausibility of some type of "biological race." In this paper, the focus will be on the phylogenetic conceptions of race, which is one of the most promising views of BRR, that define races as lineages of reproductively isolated breeding populations. However, I will argue that phylogenetic conceptions of race fail to prove that races are biologically real. I will develop and defend my argument against the phylogenetic views of race by relying on current research in population genetics, human evolution, and social sciences. Ultimately, I will argue that (i) race is not a biologically legitimate category and (ii) philosophers should direct their resources to understand problems that arise due to racialization, and thereby they should find solutions to those problems.Publication Metadata only Ambiguity and the absolute: Nietzsche and Merleau-Ponty on the question of truth(Fordham University Press, 2014) Department of Philosophy; Chouraqui, Frank; Faculty Member; Department of Philosophy; College of Social Sciences and Humanities; N/AFriedrich Nietzsche and Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Chouraqui argues, are linked by how they conceive the question of truth. Although both thinkers criticize the traditional concept of truth as objectivity, they both find that rejecting it does not solve the problem. What is it in our natural existence that gave rise to the notion of truth? The answer to that question is threefold. First, Nietzsche and Merleau-Ponty both propose a genealogy of "truth" in which to exist means to make implicit truth claims. Second, both seek to recover the preobjective ground from which truth as an erroneous concept arose. Finally, this attempt at recovery leads both thinkers to ontological considerations, regarding how we must conceive of a being whose structure allows for the existence of the belief in truth. In conclusion, Chouraqui suggests that both thinkers' investigations of the question of truth lead them to conceive of being as the process of self-falsification by which indeterminate being presents itself as determinate. The answer to that question is threefold. First, Nietzsche and Merleau-Ponty both propose a genealogy of "truth" in which to exist means to make implicit truth claims. Second, both seek to recover the preobjective ground from which truth as an erroneous concept arose. Finally, this attempt at recovery leads both thinkers to ontological considerations, regarding how we must conceive of a being whose structure allows for the existence of the belief in truth. In conclusion, Chouraqui suggests that both thinkers' investigations of the question of truth lead them to conceive of being as the process of self-falsification by which indeterminate being presents itself as determinate.Publication Metadata only Animality in Lacan and Derrida: the deconstruction of the other(Springer, 2018) Department of Philosophy; Direk, Zeynep; Faculty Member; Department of Philosophy; College of Social Sciences and Humanities; 5771In The Beast and the Sovereign, Derrida's last seminar, Derrida criticizes Lacan for making no room for animality in the Other, in the unconscious transindividual normativity of language. In this paper, I take into account the history of Derrida's interactions with Lacan's psychoanalysis to argue that Derrida's early agreement with Lacan's conception of subjectivity as split by the signifier gives place in his late thought to a deconstruction of Lacan's fall into humanist metaphysics, which makes a sharp moral distinction between the animal and the human in order to subordinate animals to the domination of mankind.Publication Metadata only Bataille and Kristeva on religion(Fordham University Press, 2015) Department of Philosophy; Direk, Zeynep; Faculty Member; Department of Philosophy; College of Social Sciences and Humanities; 5771N/APublication Metadata only Beauvoir's ethics of ambiguity and human rights(Philippine Natl Philosophical Res Soc, 2017) Department of Philosophy; Şimga, Fatma Hülya; Faculty Member; Department of Philosophy; College of Social Sciences and Humanities; 47321This paper focuses on Simone de Beauvoir 's ethics. My aim is to discuss the intimate relation of freedom and rights in order to suggest that the ethical implications ofher phenomenological-existentialist analysis of the human condition, developed mainly in The ethics of ambiguity, can make a valuable contribution to ethical value and corroboration of human rights, the conceptual grounding ofwhich is sometimes received with intellectual skepticism. I argue that in Beauvoir's ethical theory, grounded on the will to freedom, not only do rights become more intelligible but their significance also becomes more communicable. By making freedom conditional upon willing not only that oneself be free but that everyone else may also be free, Beauvoir advances a universal demand for the most basic conditions necessary for individuals to realize themselves. Accordingly, Beauvoir's conception of genuinefreedom, incorporating the value offreedom and the duty to act in recognition of this value, gives us the possibility to argue for the requisite freedoms as well as the necessity to substantiate these freedoms in human rights.Publication Metadata only Between Socrates and Kant. Thinking and sensus communis in Arendt's conception of the banality of evil(Edizioni Ets, 2017) Department of Philosophy; Roney, Patrick; Faculty Member; Department of Philosophy; College of Social Sciences and Humanities; N/AThe aim of this paper is to show how Hannah Arendt develops her concept of the banality of evil through a phenomenological appropriation of Kant's theory of judgment and of the principle of sensus communis in particular. Even though Arendt initially defined the banality of evil as a form of thoughtlessness grounded upon her understanding of thinking as an inner dialogue with one's 'other' self, I argue that she develops the concept much more extensively in relation to Kant's doctrine of reflective judgment and the possibility of a sensus communis as a pre-conceptual model of unforced consensus for the public space. I further argue that her reading of Kant is carried out together with both an existential-ontological re-appraisal of appearances and its relation to the transcendental imagination. Through the emphasis on the sensus communis, the banality of evil can then be re-defined as a refusal of the same.Publication Metadata only Conditional uniqueness(inst Philosophy Slovak acad Sciences and inst Philosophy Czech acad Sciences, 2022) Department of Philosophy; Demircioğlu, Erhan; Faculty Member; Department of Philosophy; College of Social Sciences and Humanities; 193390in this paper, I aim to do three things. First, I introduce the distinction between the Uniqueness thesis (U) and what I call the Conditional Uniqueness thesis (U*). Second, I argue that despite their official advertisements, some prominent uniquers effectively defend U* rather than U. Third, some influential considerations that have been raised by the opponents of U misfire if they are interpreted as against U*. the moral is that an appreciation of the distinction between U and U* helps to clarify the contours of the uniqueness debate and to avoid a good deal of talking past each other.Publication Metadata only Consciousness(Springer, 2012) Department of Philosophy; Demircioğlu, Erhan; Faculty Member; Department of Philosophy; College of Social Sciences and Humanities; 193390N/APublication Metadata only Critical notice: the science of virtue: a framework for research(Wiley, 2024) Zeller, Kaj Andre; Bahçeci, Berker; Graduate School of Social Sciences and Humanities