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Publication Open Access A characterization of the extended serial correspondence(Elsevier, 2015) Heo, Eun Jeong; Department of Economics; Yılmaz, Özgür; Faculty Member; Department of Economics; College of Administrative Sciences and Economics; 108638We study the problem of assigning objects to a group of agents. We focus on probabilistic methods that take agents' ordinal preferences over the objects. Importantly, we allow for indifferences among objects. Katta and Sethuraman (2006) propose the extended serial correspondence to solve this problem. Our main result is a characterization of the extended serial correspondence in welfare terms by means of stochastic dominance efficiency, stochastic dominance no-envy and "limited invariance," a requirement we adapt from Heo (2014a). We also prove that an assignment matrix is selected by the extended serial correspondence if and only if it satisfies "non-wastefulness" and "ordinal fairness," which we adapt from Kesten et al.
Publication Metadata only A two-sided reputation result with long-run players(Academic Press Inc Elsevier Science, 2013) Ekmekçi, Mehmet; Department of Economics; Atakan, Alp Enver; Faculty Member; Department of Economics; College of Administrative Sciences and Economics; 39383We establish reputation results, under two sided incomplete information, for a class of repeated games. We consider a repeated game that satisfies the assumptions of either Atakan and Ekmekci (2012) [3] or Cripps et al. (2005) [6] and we assume that both players are Stackelberg types with positive probability. If the stage game is not a common interest game, then equilibrium play converges to the unique equilibrium of a continuous time war of attrition as the stage game is repeated arbitrarily frequently. Alternatively, if the stage game is a common-interest game, then the players' equilibrium payoffs converge to their highest payoffs as the stage game is repeated arbitrarily frequently. (C) 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.Publication Metadata only An experimental study of house allocation mechanisms(Elsevier Science Sa, 2004) Chen, Yan; Department of Economics; Sönmez, Tayfun; Faculty Member; Department of Economics; College of Administrative Sciences and Economics; N/AWe report an experiment on three house allocation mechanisms under complete information: random serial dictatorship with squatting rights, and two variants of the top trading cycles mechanism. Results show that the latter two are significantly more efficient than the former.Publication Metadata only Asymmetric response to monetary policy surprises at the long-end of the yield curve(Louisiana State University Press, 2012) Department of Economics; Department of Economics; Demiralp, Selva; Yılmaz, Kamil; Faculty Member; Faculty Member; Department of Economics; College of Administrative Sciences and Economics; College of Administrative Sciences and Economics; 42533; 6111This paper investigates the responsiveness of asset markets to monetary policy path revisions. Using federal funds futures contracts to extract near-term path revisions, we find that the responsiveness of longer term Treasury securities to path revisions is significantly asymmetric, the magnitude of which increases during tightenings and decreases during easings. These findings blend nicely with the earlier literature that documents asymmetric effects of monetary policy on output. (C) 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.Publication Metadata only Backward unraveling over time: the evolution of strategic behavior in the entry level British medical labor markets(Elsevier Science Bv, 2001) Department of Economics; Ünver, Utku; Faculty Member; Department of Economics; College of Administrative Sciences and Economics; N/AThis paper studies an evolutionary programming technique, namely a genetic algorithm, to analyze how a population of decision-makers learn to coordinate the selection of an equilibrium or a social convention in a two-sided matching game with incomplete information. In the contexts of centralized and decentralized entry-level labor markets, evolution and adjustment paths of unraveling are explored using this technique in an environment inspired by the Kagel and Roth (2000. Quarterly Journal of Economics 115(1), 201-235) experimental study. As an interesting result, it is demonstrated that stability need not be required for the success of a matching mechanism under incomplete information in the long run.Publication Metadata only Bank lending standards and access to lines of credit(Wiley, 2012) James, Christopher; Kizilaslan, Atay; Department of Business Administration; Demiroğlu, Cem; Faculty Member; Department of Business Administration; College of Administrative Sciences and Economics; 18073This paper examines how changes in bank lending standards are related to the availability of bank lines of credit for private and comparable public firms. Overall, we find that access to lines of credit is more contingent on bank lending standards for private than for public firms. The impact of bank lending standards is however asymmetric: while private firms are less likely than public firms to gain access to new lines when credit market conditions are tight, we find no difference between public and private firms in terms of their use or retention of pre-existing lines. We also find that private firms without lines of credit use more trade credit when bank lending standards are tight, which is suggestive of a supply effect. Overall, the evidence suggests that credit crunches are likely to have a disproportionate impact on private firms. However, pre-existing banking relationships appear to mitigate the impact of these contractions on private firms.Publication Metadata only Can pre-arranged matches be avoided in two-sided matching markets?(Academic Press Inc, 1999) Department of Economics; Sönmez, Tayfun; Faculty Member; Department of Economics; College of Administrative Sciences and Economics; N/AWe study manipulation via pre-arranged matches in the context of centralized two-sided matching markets. We show that the solution that is used to match the hospitals and medical residents in the United States, namely the hospital-optimal stable rule, is manipulable in this way. Unfortunately this is a general problem: We show that there is no solution that is both stable and non-manipulable.Publication Metadata only Cheating and incentives in a performance context: evidence from a field experiment on children(Elsevier, 2020) Alan, Şule; Department of Economics; N/A; Ertaç, Seda; Gümren, Mert; Faculty Member; Researcher; Department of Economics; College of Administrative Sciences and Economics; Graduate School of Sciences and Engineering; 107102; N/AWe study cheating behavior in a large sample of elementary school children in the context of a creative performance task, in the presence and absence of performance incentives. Our data come from a sample of 720 elementary school children with an average age of 8, and contain rich information on a large set of correlates, such as risk and time preferences, IQ, gender and family characteristics. We document that children with higher IQ and higher socioeconomic status have a higher likelihood of cheating. We find that the presence of incentives for better performance does not increase cheating behavior. We also document an interesting interaction between altruism and incentives: altruistic students cheat significantly less in the presence of incentives. (C) 2019 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.Publication Metadata only Costly signal extraction and profit differentials in oligopolistic markets(Elsevier, 2000) Çağlayan, Mustafa; Department of Economics; Usman, Ali Murat; Teaching Faculty; Department of Economics; College of Administrative Sciences and Economics; 100999Empirical evidence indicates that there can be persistent profit differentials between firms in an industry. We show that demand uncertainty and costly information acquisition by firms on market demand leads to significant profit differentials for intermediate levels of demand variability.Publication Metadata only Credible group stability in many-to-many matching problems(Elsevier, 2006) Konishi, Hideo; Department of Economics; Ünver, Utku; Faculty Member; Department of Economics; College of Administrative Sciences and Economics; N/AIt is known that in two-sided many-to-many matching problems. pairwise-stable matchings may not be immune to group deviations. unlike in many-to-one matching problems (Blair. 1988). In this paper, we show that pairwise stability is equivalent to credible group stability when one side has responsive preferences and the other side has categorywise-responsive preferences. A credibly group-stable matching is immune to any "executable" group deviations with an appropriate definition of executability. Under the same preference restriction. we also show the equivalence between the set of pairwise-stable matchings and the set of matchings generated by coalition-proof Nash equilibria of an appropriately defined strategic-form game.