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Room assignment-rent division: a market approach

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Abdulkadiroğlu, Atila

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A group of friends consider renting a house but they shall first agree on how to allocate its rooms and share the rent. We propose an auction mechanism for room assignment-rent division problems which mimics the market mechanism. Our auction mechanism is efficient, envy-free, individually-rational and it yields a non-negative price to each room whenever that is possible with envy-freeness.

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Springer

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Social Choice and Welfare

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10.1007/s00355-003-0231-0

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