Publication:
Room assignment-rent division: a market approach

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Abdulkadiroğlu, Atila

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English

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Abstract

A group of friends consider renting a house but they shall first agree on how to allocate its rooms and share the rent. We propose an auction mechanism for room assignment-rent division problems which mimics the market mechanism. Our auction mechanism is efficient, envy-free, individually-rational and it yields a non-negative price to each room whenever that is possible with envy-freeness.

Source:

Social Choice and Welfare

Publisher:

Springer

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Subject

Economics, Social sciences

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