Publication: Room assignment-rent division: a market approach
Program
KU-Authors
KU Authors
Co-Authors
Abdulkadiroğlu, Atila
Publication Date
Language
Type
Embargo Status
Journal Title
Journal ISSN
Volume Title
Alternative Title
Abstract
A group of friends consider renting a house but they shall first agree on how to allocate its rooms and share the rent. We propose an auction mechanism for room assignment-rent division problems which mimics the market mechanism. Our auction mechanism is efficient, envy-free, individually-rational and it yields a non-negative price to each room whenever that is possible with envy-freeness.
Source
Publisher
Springer
Subject
Economics, Social sciences
Citation
Has Part
Source
Social Choice and Welfare
Book Series Title
Edition
DOI
10.1007/s00355-003-0231-0